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THE STRUCTURES OF FEDERALISM
Martha A. Field'
The difficult thing about commenting upon Cass Sunstein's work is
that I agree with so many of his points, and he makes them about as
well as they can be made. Fundamentally, I agree with his conclusion
that federalism is likely to play a role in the constitutional design of a
democratic, post-apartheid South Africa, and also that it can be a useful
structure.
The Virtues of Federalism
Professor Sunstein reviews many good reasons for adopting a solution
involving federalism: the more governments there are, the more participation and the greater variety of voices; having many levels of government serves the same checking function as having levels of courts, or
separating legislative, judicial, and executive branches; decentralization in
government contributes to decentralization in the economy, which contributes to prosperity.
I was particularly interested in the point that federalism was part of
the Framers' intent to create a deliberative government, and that this
was both central to the United States experience and at the expense of a
more democratic structure. Federalism as a structure may promote stability, but if so, it also can slow change. At the same time, because it
allows for experimentation-allowing for different systems to exist and
varied proposals to be tried in different states-federalism makes it
possible for change, when it comes, to be based upon firmer foundations
than if it were achieved more swiftly and more easily.'
I was also interested in Sunstein's description of the power of exit;
the concept is that individuals-as well as companies-leave states
whose laws they find oppressive and move to areas in which they are

* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Federalism is like other counter-majoritarian features of our Constitution inasmuch as it promotes stability and slows change. But not all of the countermajoritarian characteristics share these attributes. The Bill of Rights and the institution
of judicial review, for example, at least in practice, have become promoters of change
as much as inhibitors of it.
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more comfortable. If it is important to a white man to live where there
is a high percentage of whites, for example, he can choose to live in
such an area. Then, if residents of that same area want blacks to work
there, they will have to make it an attractive place for blacks as well. In
order for the power of exit to have any substantial effect, persons must
have available both the means to move around and also options that are
attractive to them. The right of exit plays much less of a role in a system where it is difficult to move to the good life.
Costs
Federalism, then, is a useful tool for encouraging experimentation and
diversity-and, adds Professor Sunstein, democracy, prosperity, stability,
and deliberation. But federalism is not a tool for all times or all places.
For example, sometimes what is needed is nation-building and centralization, not the dispersion of authority. When that is the case, federalism
can be counterproductive.
Even when federalism is appropriate, it has its costs. In addition to
costs that Professor Sunstein has identified, corruption may be a cost of
a federal system. There is both charm and value to the concept, eloquently described by Professor Nicholas Kittrie in his speech, that the
best government is the one closest to the people. Ideally, such a government would be the most responsive. But our history would also suggest
both that local government may be more subject to corruption and that
corruption may be harder to control at the local level.
In addition, a major cost of federalism that must be acknowleged is
the duplication and inefficiency it entails. Though not inherent to every
federal system, one example that exists in our country is a dual court
system. The United States government has a fully developed court system, and each state government also has its own complete court system.
In addition, our system of concurrent jurisdiction allows many cases to
be heard either in state or federal court. And in this system enormous
energy can be spent deciding which forum will hear any particular case.
Sometimes such choice-of-forum litigation precedes trial of the case
on the merits. While both systems tackle questions about which of them
ought to go forward, the case remains unheard. But some cases are
litigated-simultaneously or consecutively-in both systems, and then
much time and expense may be spent deciding which system's resolution is to prevail.
In short, much time, energy, and money can be spent coordinating
state and national systems. The problem is not inherent to federalism,
but it is a problem that governments with a federal system must guard
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against. The problem is not even inherent in a dual court system. The
costs of the American system, for instance, could be greatly reduced by
setting clearer boundaries between federal and state jurisdictions; limiting
concurrent jurisdiction; or enacting clear rules concerning when one
jurisdiction should defer to the other, to give just a few examples.
Federal systems need not have a full dual court system, but there are
advantages to it. In the United States, federal law is much better enforced and more uniformly applied because there is a full system of
lower federal courts. Moreover, state law is a much more independent
body of law because of the existence of state court systems, which
interpret and develop the meaning of state law independent of federal
authority. The same duality that is costly and inefficient, then, also has
advantages that may be worth the costs, particularly if vaguely-defined
and overlapping jurisdictions, with their inefficiencies, can be minimized.
Some of what Professor Sunstein referred to as costs of federalism are
not to my mind really costs of federalism at all but rather independent
problems that in the United States system happen to coexist with federalism. For example, whether government can redistribute wealth in a
federal system depends largely upon whether the constitution and laws
give government that power. Even though in the United States redistribution has been inadequate, that is not a necessary result of a federal
system. Similarly, whether minorities in the various localities will be
protected depends, as Professor Sunstein recognizes, upon whether the
central government "can create a vigorous bill of rights enforceable
against local units."' But elsewhere Sunstein characterizes these (and the
problems of lack of coordination between different levels of government)
as "problems caused by federalism."3 Federalism does not cause these
problems, nor has it been demonstrated that it inherently contributes to
them.
What Is Federalism Anyway?
I find particularly interesting those of Professor Sunstein's points that
are about federalism itself. For this purpose, I define federalism as the
division of powers of government between national and sub-national
levels, with each level possessing and exercising important powers. In
his discussion of federalism and its potential for diffusing conflict,

2. Cass R. Sunstein, Federalism in South Africa? Notes from the American
Experience, 8 AlM. UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 421, 425 (1993).
3.

t at 428.
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Sunstein is thus describing the structure of federalism as such. Similarly
his points about proliferating points of access to government, competing
power centers, the right of exit, and local experimentation relate to the
structure of federalism. Professor Sunstein also attributes to federalism,
however, characteristics found in the federal system of the United
States-like the "costs" mentioned above-but which result from the
particular distribution of powers between national and state spheres that
our Constitution adopts but that have nothing to do with federalism as
such. Important aspects of our federalism in the United States that may
have contributed to the success of our system but that are not necessary
components of a federal system include: the states' role in the composition of the national government-in the election of our President by
the electoral college, for example, or in the equal representation of each
state in the Senate; states' participation as such in the process of constitutional amendment, but their lack of any veto over federal legislation;
the absence of any state right to secede from the Union; and the operation of federal government directly on the people, not just through the
member states.
One reason that I like to use the term "federalism" to describe simply
a governmental structure with (at least) two different, significant levels
of governments-one national unit and several sub-national units-is to
emphasize that federalism is compatible with many different kinds of
values and substantive rules. It even is compatible with many different
kinds of governmental structures. Moreover, governmental powers can be
distributed in very different ways in federal systems.
Canada and the United States, for example, both have federal systems.
But the powers of the central government are very different in the Canadian and United States systems. The central government in the United
States has authority to regulate virtually all economic activity, but in
Canada the federal government cannot impose economic plans and solutions without the participation and assent of the provinces. Similarly,
labor law is an important subject of national controls in the United
States but is governed by the provinces in Canada. On the other hand,
marriage, divorce and criminal law are clearly associated with the states
in the United States, but are governed by the central government in
Canada. In both nations, the central government controls defense and
foreign relations, and one might suppose that in a federal system such
powers would be crucial to the central government. But in the European
Economic Community-to look at yet another federal structure-the
union is devoted primarily to building an economically-integrated community with common commercial policies, but the member nations retain
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control over their own foreign affairs.
Clearly, then, one federal system can have a very different governmental structure than other federal systems. How a particular constitution
distributes particular powers, and how the authority of the various governments develops in practice, are crucial in determining the way the
government works and are at least as significant as a choice for or
against federalism. A choice for federalism does not resolve or even
address questions of how powerful different levels of government should
be vis d vis each other.
A constitution can try very precisely to delineate the spheres of authority of each level of government, but unconsidered issues are bound
to arise. How the government deals with new issues, and how the national constitution allows for change, are at least as important to peace,
stability and dynamism in a constitutional system as federalism is, and
the choice of a federal structure does not itself dictate the resolution of
these issues. In addition to provision for change, it also is very important that there be in place a system whereby federal law will be enforced.
In the United States our processes for constitutional amendment and
the institution of judicial review as it has evolved have been extremely
important to the success and durability of our constitutional experiment.
One of the greatest changes in the balance of power between the states
and the federal government in the United States occurred in the 19th
century when the federal government acquired power to legislate concerning civil rights and to make states comply with national standards
on civil rights questions. This was accomplished directly by constitutional amendment-the Civil War amendments-and by subsequent congressional legislation and judicial interpretation. But even the constitutional
amendments were not adopted until after a civil war had threatened the
breakdown of the federal system.
In the United States, the adoption of the Civil War amendments led
to greater centralization over civil rights. It is basic to the United States
governmental structure today that civil rights will be protected by the
national government and the national judiciary. Human rights may indeed be a subject that should be entrusted to a central govemment-a
subject on which diversity should not be tolerated. Nations differ as to
what powers they lodge in the central and local governments, but some
subjects are more appropriate than others for diverse application. A
central inquiry in any federal system, is who is to decide which powers
will be reposed in which level. Here also, a choice for federalism does
not presuppose any one particular answer.
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Certainly the situation of the United States today suggests that a nation can have a federal system and at the same time have a very strong
central government." Indeed the central government in the United States
has such broad powers today that some question whether it still is appropriate to call it a federal system at all.' In the United States there is
not actually dual sovereignty, with separate spheres for each level of
government, but rather concurrent sovereignty. The original scheme was
that the federal government would have limited and specified powers
(powers that were usually shared by the states); that when the federal
government exercised those powers, its pronouncements would be supreme, but that the residuary powers not placed within the control of the
central government would be left to the states. State powers were thus
defined primarily as those powers not specifically conferred on the federal government. Initially, the powers this system left solely to states
were significant, including the basic police functions of government. But
contrary to the original conception of a sharply limited federal government, the development of a strong central government in the United
States has left no significant sphere of authority in which the Constitution allows only states to operate.
The Civil War amendments' addition to federal powers contributed to
much greater centralization than at the outset of our history. The development of a nationalized economy also put great pressure in the direction of centralization. Centralization was accomplished within the existing constitutional framework by broad definition of the enumerated
powers of the federal government. During the past six decades, the
limited and enumerated powers of the federal government have been
defined so broadly, by courts and by Congress, that there is almost no
area to which they do not extend. Accordingly, there is almost no
sphere left in which only state law can operate. It is this fact that makes
some question whether the United States does indeed still have a federal
system.

4. The central government of Canada is more limited in relation to the provinces than the national government in the United States is in relation to the states.
There is an irony in this fact: when Canada drafted its Constitution the effort was to
create a strong centralized system; the United States' plan, on the other hand, was for
substantial states' rights. In both countries, courts and subsequent developments altered
the original plan so that the result in Canada was stronger prerogatives for the provinces and in the United States was stronger central government.
5. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1709 (1985) (asserting that Garcia surrendered inordinate power to the federal
government).
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Our system does still fit within my definition of federalism-and
within the definition adopted by our Supreme Court-because states do
still in fact exercise substantial and significant powers, such as licensing,
the regulation of real estate, marriage and family law, and criminal law.
But it is not the Constitution as such that is placing the primary limits
on where state law will operate and where federal law and government
will operate, but instead the Congress. Congress effectively has the
choice of which spheres will be governed by the national system and
which will be governed by states. What is state and what is federal,
then, has become more of an issue of national policy than of constitutional law, at least in the first instance.
The Supreme Court still retains the authority to intercede, and says it
will, should the states be obliterated by the national government-should
the federal government leave no significant area for the operation of
state government. But the first choice as to which areas of law are to
left to the states and which will remain to the national government is
with Congress, and the courts have adopted a general attitude of deference to congressional judgment in this area. As long as substantial powers are left to the states, as they certainly have been throughout our
history, there is "federalism" in one sense, despite Congress' control
over the distribution of powers. This is federalism within the meaning
set out above-significant power existing on each of the two levels of
government-and that is the definition the United States Supreme Court
suggested in the definitive case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.6
In short, the term "federalism" can be used to refer to very different
things. There is bona fide disagreement about what the term should
mean: for example, need there be separate constitutionally-created
spheres in which only subunits can operate in order to satisfy the requisites of federalism? Moreover, in our history, debates about federalism
have sometimes been used as a smokescreen for debates about other
issues. For example, sometimes the term "federalism" is used to describe
the political position that states should have greater powers and rights
than they do." For another example, there are periods in our history in
which "states' rights" have been associated with racism. Moreover, even
those taking strong states' rights positions favor a national solution on
certain issues; a national and uniform solution is likely to be favored

6. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (describing "our Federalisrm" as a system requiring strong states' rights).
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when the national solution that would be adopted is the one they would
agree with on the merits. It is not at all unusual for a person's position
on the issue of national versus state powers to be much more influenced
by their substantive agenda than by their ideas about federalism.
Sensing the difference in what various speakers were describing under
the rubric of "federalism," a representative from South Africa's Communist Party asked this morning of one of our speakers, "But what is the
essence of federalism?" My response is that there may not be very
much "essence" and that federalism is primarily a tool of government
and a vessel into which very different substances can be poured. It is a
structure which can be useful, and it is a structure which by itself is
largely value-neutral.
Conclusion
What does this tell us that might be useful to South Africa? It does
show that a choice for federalism is merely a first step, and a very
small first step at that. Federalism is a good choice. It can be an effective tool of government and can play a role in achieving peace and
stability, and perhaps even democracy, prosperity, and deliberation. But
a choice for federalism still does not answer some of most important
questions about what the government's structure will be. It does not tell
us which powers will be lodged in which level of government, or how
important one level will be vis d vis the other. It does not tell us to
what extent the government will be democratic or counter-majoritarian.
And it does not answer important questions like how the government
will respond to change.
Federalism is a good structure to try, but it advances the inquiry in
only a tiny way. Not only is it a small piece of the governmental
structure; even when the rest of the structure is filled out, all we have is
the designation of a tool that can be useful in resolving substantive
differences. The real problem is finding a way to deal with important
substantive differences that exist-such as the degree of economic redistribution and the degree and methods of protection for the rights of minorities. A choice of federalism says nothing concerning such bedrock
issues, in the sense that a system of federalism is compatible with any
resolution of such issues. Federalism will not resolve the most pressing
problems, but neither will it stand in the way of appropriate substantive
solutions. But South Africa will need more than what Professor Sunstein
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calls "creativity about the details"' to make it work.
It should be comparatively easy for a gathering like this one to agree
on federalism, in part because of the reasons Professor Sunstein has
persuasively put forth. But what kind of government results, and who
has power over whom, will depend upon how the so-called details are
filled in. It will be understandably more difficult to achieve agreement
on those issues.

8. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 444.

